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CIVIL PROCEDURE AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
Changing New Mexico Remittitur Procedure to
Protect the Appropriate Balance of Power Between
Judge and Jury-AIlsup's Convenience Stores, Inc. v. North
River Insurance Co.
SEAN J. SULLIVAN*
I. INTRODUCTION
In Allsup's Convenience Stores, Inc. v. North River Insurance Co.,' the New
Mexico Supreme Court radically changed the law of remittitur. The court's decision
makes it much more difficult for a trial court to successfully reduce the size of a jury
verdict. Consequently, most defendants will now file motions for a new trial, rather
than motions for a remittitur, when they find a jury's award of damages to be
excessive.
Remittitur is a post-trial order issued by a court when it finds a jury's award of
damages excessive and the result of "passion, prejudice, partiality, sympathy, undue
influence,... corrupt motive.. .or where the jury has mistaken the measure of
damages."' Traditionally, remittitur orders gave plaintiffs a choice between
accepting a smaller award or undergoing a new trial.3 If the plaintiff accepted the
smaller amount, he or she waived the right to appeal.4 If the plaintiff refused the
remittitur, he or she could not appeal until after the conclusion of a second trial.5
Allsup's held that traditional remittitur procedure violated the constitutional right
to trial by jury6 as granted in the Constitution of the State of New Mexico.7 Because
remittitur substantially limited a plaintiffs opportunity to appeal, it enabled trial
courts to override a jury's verdict and substitute the court's own assessment of
damages. The court's change to the jury verdict would also escape appellate review.
In response, the Allsup's court held that trial judges issuing remittitur orders must
give plaintiffs the option of conditionally accepting the remittitur "under protest,"
which would in turn allow for the filing of an immediate appeal.8 Furthermore, the
court held that trial judges must provide express reasons for ordering a remittitur
based on evidence of passion or prejudice, and that the appellee assumes the burden
on appeal to show that the jury awarded excessive damages.9
* Class of 2002, University of New Mexico School of Law. The author wishes to thank Professor M.E.
Occhialino for his guidance in the research and analysis contained in this Note.
1. 127 N.M. 1,976 P.2d 1 (1998).
2. Id. at 9, 976 P.2d at 9.
3. Id. at 6, 976 P.2d at 6.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 6, 976 P.2d at 6.
6. Id. at 8, 976 P.2d at 8.
7. N.M. CONST. art. II, § 12 ("The right to trial by jury as it has heretofore existed shall be secured to all
and remain inviolate.").
8. Id. at 9, 976 P.2d at 9. A plaintiff who accepts a proposed remittitur "under protest" essentially rejects
the judge's assessment of damages. The "acceptance" is merely a procedural technique used for the purpose of
rendering the judgment final so that the plaintiff can file an appeal and contest the propriety of the judge's remittitur
order. Id. at 7, 976 P.2d at 7.
9. id. at 9-10, 976 P.2d at 9-10.
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Allsup's makes it much more difficult for a trial court to decrease the amount of
damages awarded by a jury. As a result, defendants who find verdicts to be
excessive will now probably favor motions for a new trial over remittitur motions
because new trial orders are not subject to immediate appeal and are reversible only
for abuse of discretion.
This Note will address how Allsup's radically changed remittitur in New Mexico.
Section II will summarize the history of remittitur procedure. Section H will set
forth the facts and procedural history of the case. Section IV will explain the
rationale for the court's decision. Section V will analyze whether the court made a
wise decision and discuss the implications of Allsup's for future cases.
II. BACKGROUND
The historic justification for remittitur is that it saves time and money by
facilitating settlements.'" Remittitur theoretically allows both parties to walk away
satisfied." The plaintiff obtains the compensation the trial judge considers
reasonable, while avoiding the expense and time commitment of a second trial. 2
Meanwhile, the defendant pays a sum less than that awarded by the jury. 3
The use of remittitur dates back to English common law. " From the earliest days
of the English jury system, judges have granted new trials in cases where they found
that the jury awarded excessive damages.1 5 Remittitur emerged as an effective
alternative to new trial orders as litigation became more complex, costly, and time
consuming.1 6 It is unclear how often English judges utilized remittitur, 7 but the
practice dates back at least as far as 1764. At that time, the judge in Breadmore v.
Carrington asked the plaintiff in a trespass and false imprisonment case to accept
reduced damages rather than a new trial.'8
Remittitur became a part of American law in 1812 when future United States
Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story decided Blunt v. Little, a malicious prosecution
case. 9 A jury awarded $2000 in damages and Story agreed to deny the defendant's
motion for a new trial if the plaintiff would agree to remit a portion of the award.
The judge clearly recognized the magnitude of his decision:
I have the greatest hesitation in interfering with the verdict, and in so doing, I
believe that I go to the very limits of the law. After full reflection, I am of [the]
opinion, that it is reasonable that the cause should be submitted to another jury,
unless the plaintiff is willing to remit $500 of his damages.20
10. Id. at 6, 976 P.2d at 6.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. See Breadmore v. Carrington, 95 Eng. Rep. 790 (K.B. 1764).
15. See 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND 300 (Lippincott 1874).
16. See Brad Snyder, Protecting the Media from Excessive Damages: The Nineteenth-Century Origins of
Remittitur and Its Modern Application in Food Lion, 24 VT. L. REV. 299 (2000).
17. See id.
18. See Breadmore, 95 Eng. Rep. at 790.
19. 3 F. Cas. 760 (C.C.D. Mass. 1822).
20. Id. at 762.
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During the Industrial Revolution, remittitur became a common judicial practice.21
Prior to that era, most cases on judicial dockets involved contracts, debt, land
disputes, or property destruction.22 Judges seldom used remittitur because juries
found damages relatively easy to calculate.23 Industrialization led to more personal
injury cases where assessing damages proved more difficult.24 Thus, judges found
themselves compelled to intervene more frequently. Commentators disagree over
what motivated judges to order more remittiturs.25 Many do note, however, that
judges often acted to protect businesses from populist juries who were well aware
of the deep pockets of commercial entities.26
The Supreme Court of the United States found remittitur constitutional in Dimick
v. Schiedt.27 The decision settled the issue of whether, in federal court cases,
remittitur conflicted with the Seventh Amendment right to trial by jury.28 The Court
justified its decision by invoking the doctrine of stare decisis. "[F]or more than a
century the federal courts have followed the approved practice of conditioning the
allowance of a new trial on the consent of plaintiff to remit excessive damages..." 29
However, the court hinted that "if the question of remittitur were now before us for
the first time, it would be decided otherwise."3 Thus, a century of case law made
it impractical for the Court to find remittitur unconstitutional.
From the early days of New Mexico's statehood, it has been the law that trial
judges may require a remittitur as an alternative to granting a new trial in cases
where the court finds the jury's verdict excessive.3' In Henderson v. Dreyfus, thejury awarded the plaintiff $35,000 after the defendant newspaper publisher printed
a story alleging that the plaintiff desecrated an American flag.32 The trial Court found
the verdict excessive and allowed the plaintiff to choose between a new trial or
$10,000.
33
The New Mexico Supreme Court further refined the standard of review for
remittitur orders in two cases from the 1950s. In Hall v. Stiles,34 the court affirmed
ajury verdict of $50,000 for the plaintiff in a wrongful death action.35 The court held
that the jury's findings should be disturbed only for passion or prejudice, not merely
because the trial judge believed that the amount of money awarded by the jury was
greater than he or she would have awarded.36 The court followed the Hall precedent
in Montgomery v. Vigil,37 which focused on personal injuries sustained in an
21. Snyder, supra note 16, at 307.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 308.
24. Id. at317.
25. Id. at 313-14.
26. Id.
27. 293 U.S. 474 (1935).
28. Id.
29. Id. at 474.
30. Id.
31. See Henderson v. Dreyfus, 26 N.M. 541, 556-57, 191 P. 442, 448 (1919).
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. 57 N.M. 281, 258 P.2d 386 (1953).
35. Id.
36. Id. at 285, 258 P.2d at 390.
37. 65 N.M. 107, 332 P.2d 1023 (1958).
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automobile accident. The jury awarded the plaintiff $5000.38 The court concluded
that the jury based its decision on passion or prejudice.39 It ordered the plaintiff to
accept $3000 or undergo a new trial.4" Thus, the New Mexico Supreme Court
reaffirmed in Montgomery what it held in Hall, that remittitur is only warranted
when a jury verdict is excessive and influenced by passion, prejudice, or a similar
motive.4
I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Allsup's Enterprises, Inc. (Allsup's), a convenience store chain, entered into a
series of agreements to purchase workers' compensation and general liability
insurance coverage from North River Insurance Company and United States Fire
Insurance (North River).42 Alexsis, Inc. entered the agreements as a third party
administrator directly responsible for claims handling.43 The premiums paid by the
convenience store chain were based in part upon the losses it incurred." As such,
Allsup's made payments based on an estimated premium. Once the policy period
expired, North River then adjusted the cost of Allsup's coverage upward or
downward, depending on Allsup's actual losses.45
This lawsuit arose from alleged breaches of the contracts made by Allsup's, North
River, and Alexsis.' Allsup's made three claims against North River. First, Allsup' s
alleged that North River breached an obligation to supervise and ensure the quality
of the claims handling facilitated by Alexsis. 47 Second, Allsup's alleged a wrongful
drawdown on a letter of credit by North River.49 Third, Allsup's alleged that North
River failed to perform loss control services, such as instituting programs to
diminish injuries on the job."0 North River filed a counterclaim against Allsup's and
alleged that the corporation failed to make required premium payments.5"
District Court Judge Susan Conway entered judgment following a twelve-week
trial.52 The jury awarded Allsup's $540,000 in compensatory damages for North
River's inadequate claims handling and $4792 in compensatory damages for North
River's wrongful drawdown.53 It also awarded Allsup's $4,000,000 in punitive
damages for North River's bad faith supervision of claims handling and $500,000
38. Id. at 108, 332 P.2d at 1024.
39. Id. at 113, 332 P.2d at 1027.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Allsup's Convenience Stores, Inc. v. North River Ins. Co., 127 N.M. 1, 5, 976 P.2d 1, 5 (1998).
43. Alexsis had no part in the appeal because it reached a settlement with Allsup's after trial. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. North River required Alsup's to provide security for potential unpaid premiums in the form of a letter
of credit. North River later "drew down" the letter when Allsup's failed to pay premiums due under their contract.
Id. at 16, 976 P.2d at 16.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 5, 976 P.2d at 5.
51. Id. at 6, 976 P.2d at 6.
52. Id. at 7, 976 P.2d at 7.
53. Id. at 5-6, 976 P.2d at 5-6.
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in punitive damages for North River's wrongful drawdown 4 By directed verdict,
the court awarded $1,645,708 to North River for unpaid premiums by Allsup's.5
Thus, the verdict amounted to a net award of $3,399,084 for Allsup's.
In response to the award of damages, North River filed a "Motion to Amend the
Judgment, for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict [NOV], or in the Alternative,
for New Trial, or for Remittitur. ' ' 56 The court denied the motion for judgment NOV,
but granted a remittitur in the amount of $3,000,000 on the award for inadequate
supervision of claims handling and a remittitur in the amount of $400,000 on the
award for wrongful drawdown.57 The ruling did not clearly state whether the
plaintiff had the option of rejecting the remittitur and undergoing a new trial." In the
end, the remittitur resulted in an entry of judgment for $916 for North River.59
North River then filed a motion asking the court to stipulate a time period during
which Allsup's had to either accept the remittitur or accept a new trial.60 Instead of
responding to the motion, Allsup's filed a notice of appeal.6 Under existing case
law, remittitur orders were ordinarily not considered final judgments, and thus, were
not appealable. 62 Despite this, Allsup's alleged that the remittitur order constituted
a final judgment because it failed to give the corporation a choice between accepting
the remittitur or a new trial, rather than a smaller award of damages.63
The Allsup's appeal raised an important question about appellate review of
remittitur orders. In Nally v. Texas-Arizona Motor Freight, Inc.,64 the New Mexico
Supreme Court held that an order granting a remittitur, or in the alternative a new
trial, was not immediately appealable. Under Nally, plaintiffs had the limited choice
of taking the lesser sum determined by the judge and waiving appeal, or undergoing
the new trial and appealing thereafter.65 Under Nally, a plaintiff could not accept a
remittitur order "under protest" and then immediately appeal the propriety of the
remittitur order.'
In deciding the Allsup's appeal, the New Mexico Supreme Court held that it
believed the remittitur procedure used in Nally potentially violated both the
constitutional right to trial by jury and the constitutional right to one appeal from a
final judgment.67 If the plaintiff accepted the remittitur, he or she waived the right
to appeal." If the plaintiff refused the remittitur, he or she could only appeal after
undergoing a second trial.69 This limited right to appeal created a potential conflict
with the right to trial by jury because it enabled trial judges to override verdicts
54. Id. at 6, 976 P.2d at 6.
55. Id.
56. Id
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. id
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. 67 N.M. 153, 156, 353 P.2d 678, 680 (1960).
65. Id.
66. Allsup's, 127 N.M. at 6, 976 P.2d at 6.
67. Id.
68. Nally, 67 N.M. at 156, 353 P.2d at 680.
69. id.
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without subjecting themselves to appellate review.' Given the choice between
accepting a smaller award of damages or risking everything in a new trial, most
plaintiffs chose to accept the remittitur and end the litigation.7' Thus, in Allsup's, the
New Mexico Supreme Court chose to consider the issue of whether a claimed error
in granting a motion for a remittitur should be reviewed as any other claimed error
on appeal.72
IV. RATIONALE
The New Mexico Supreme Court based its decision in Allsup's on constitutional
grounds73 and ultimately found that the remittitur procedure used prior to Allsup's
violated the constitutional right to trial by jury.74 Because remittitur provided
plaintiffs with such a limited opportunity to appeal, the procedure essentially
enabled trial judges to substitute their assessment of damages in place of the jury's
verdict.75 Consequently, Allsup's held that a plaintiff could now accept a remittitur
order "under protest" and file an immediate appeal.76 Moreover, the court held that
the appellee, and not the appellant, shall assume the burden on appeal and thus must
show that the trial judge's decision is well supported by evidence of passion or
prejudice.77
The court asserted that its decision ensured a plaintiff's constitutional right to trial
by jury by offering the opportunity to appeal a remittitur order immediately.7" The
Allsup's opinion promised that "the voices of the jury" would be heard regardless
of whether the appellate court affirmed or denied the trial judge's order.79 If the
higher court affirmed, the plaintiff could still refuse the judge's remittitur proposal
on remand and present his case to a new jury during retrial. If the higher court
reversed, the original jury verdict would be reinstated. Thus, Allsup's guaranteed
plaintiffs the right to have a jury determine damages by allowing them to appeal
remittitur orders immediately.
The court also asserted that Allsup's protected the constitutional right to one
appeal from a final judgment.80 Existing remittitur procedure waived the right to
appeal when a plaintiff accepted a remittitur.8 ' It delayed appeal when the plaintiff
refused a remittitur and decided to undergo a new trial.82 Allsup's changed remittitur
procedure to allow for immediate appeal.83 Thus, the court protected the
70. Allsup's, 127 N.M. at 6, 976 P.2d at 6.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 8, 976 P.2d at 8.
74. Id.; N.M. CONST. art. I, § 12 ("The right to trial by jury as it has heretofore existed shall be secured to
all and remain inviolate.").
75. Allsup's, 127 N.M. at 8, 976 P.2d at 8.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 9, 976 P.2d at 9.
78. Id. at 8, 976 P.2d at 8.
79. Id.
80. Id.; N.M. CONST. art. VI, § 2 ("an aggrieved party shall have an absolute right to one appeal").
81. Nally, 67 N.M. at 156, 353 P.2d at 680.
82. Id.
83. Allsup's, 127 N.M. at 8, 976 P.2d at 8.
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constitutional right to appeal by holding that plaintiffs could obtain a final judgment
by accepting a remittitur under protest.
The court also offered several more reasons to support its holding. First, the court
attacked the historic rationale for remittitur by demonstrating how the circumstances
of this case conflicted with the procedure's underlying theory. ' Traditionally, courts
considered remittitur to be an effective tool because it generally facilitated
settlements and allowed both parties to walk away satisfied.85 The court noted,
however, that "[s]uch a theory can hardly be said to apply.. .where the plaintiff is
outraged, not mollified, by the remittitur choice, and where there is
disagreement.. .as to what a 'reasonable' jury should have awarded."86 The
circumstances of Allsup's were also employed to illustrate how remittitur does not
always foster efficient dispute resolution. The court noted that the judicial interest
in efficiency is only served when the plaintiff accepts the remittitur, rather than
undergoing a new trial.8 7 The trial in Allsup's lasted twelve weeks. Thus, the court
surmised, if the plaintiff refused the remittitur, a retrial would consume substantial
judicial resources.88
The court projected that this change in the law would improve the consistency of
trial results and prevent arbitrary conduct by trial judges.8 9 It proposed that the
immediate opportunity to appeal a remittitur order to a panel of appellate judges
decreases the likelihood that an arbitrary or ill-conceived action by a single judge
would go uncorrected.9" In this way, the Allsup's court considered consistency as
another benefit of its change in the law of remittitur.
The judicial goal of resolving disputes on the merits was also addressed in the
Allsup's opinion. The court portrayed the issue of remittitur as a struggle between
competing goals, where the interest in resolving disputes on the merits must prevail
over the interest in judicial economy.9' The court focused on the well-recognized
proposition that the chief objective of civil litigation is to provide plaintiffs with a
fair opportunity to prove their contentions and obtain adequate compensation, while
also providing the defendant with a fair chance to rebut those contentions. 92 "The
main rationale for remittitur is the promotion of efficiency. Yet those who support
the practice on this basis clearly do not wish to compromise justice in the interest
of efficiency."93 As such, the court based its decision in part on the need to resolve
disputes on the merits, even when efficiency is compromised. 94
84. Id. at 7, 976 P.2d at 7.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 8, 976 P.2d at 8.
90. Barbara Lemer, Remittitur Review: Constitutionality and Efficiency in Liquidated Damages Cases, 43
U. Cm. L. REv. 376, 391 (1976).
91. Allsup's, 127 N.M. at 7-8, 976 P.2d at 7-8.
92. Id.
93. See id. at 8, 976 P.2d at 8 (quoting Lerner, supra note 90, at 391).
94. The interest in resolving disputes on the merits also helps to explain the court's decision to shift the
burden of proof to the appellee on appeal. Such a shift is unusual in New Mexico civil procedure. It occurs in other
instances, however, where a trial court's decision interferes with a trial on the merits. An order granting summary
judgment or a directed verdict is an example of this phenomenon.
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The Allsup's opinion distinguished the New Mexico Supreme Court's position
from the federal system's approach to remittitur. It reviewed the United States
Supreme Court's opinion in Donovan v. Penn Shipping Co.," which set out the
remittitur procedure for federal courts. Donovan held that plaintiffs are barred from
obtaining review of remittitur orders, even when they accept the orders "under
protest." In the end, the New Mexico Supreme Court concluded that Donovan
lacked sufficient analysis to support its holding." Allsup's stated that "[t]he [United
States Supreme] Court offered no analysis for its ruling, but merely cited to a long
and unbroken line of decisions [that] had frequently been applied."'97 Allsup's opted
to not follow the federal court rule governing remittitur because the court found it
unsupported by sound rationale.98
Allsup's also changed the appeal process for remittitur orders. As stated earlier,
it held that trial judges must clearly articulate their reasons for granting a
remittitur,' 9 and that defendants face the burden on appeal to justify a trial judge's
remittitur order."° The court based this holding on the principle that it is the
"fundamental function of a jury to determine damages." ' It also acknowledged
that judges are potent figures capable of exerting substantial power and influence
over juries.0 2 Therefore, the court extended the "specific finding" requirement of
Montgomery v. Vigil by requiring trial judges to clearly articulate how and why
damages are excessive.0 3 It held that verdicts should be reduced only when the trial
judge can offer specific findings that his or her opinion is more reliable than the
jury's.10°4
V. ANALYSIS AND IMPLICATIONS
Allsup's made an important change in New Mexico law that protects the
appropriate balance of power between judges and juries in the state's legal system.
Before Allsup's, remittitur gave trial judges tremendous power to override jury
verdicts and no mechanism existed to check this power. Plaintiffs could obtain
neither immediate appellate review if the plaintiff rejected the remittitur order, nor
any appellate review if the plaintiff accepted the remittitur. Judges could present
plaintiffs with a choice between walking away with some compensation and
avoiding the expenses of a new trial, or declining the proposed award and
relitigating the case with no guarantee of the outcome. Given this choice, it seems
reasonable to conclude that most plaintiffs would opt for the remittitur, thus
95. 536 F.2d 536, aftid, 429 U.S. 648 (1977).
96. Allsup's, 127 N.M. at 7, 976 P.2d at 7.
97. Id. (quoting Wiggs v. Courshon, 485 F.2d 1281 (5th Cir. 1973).
98. The court also cited to cases in which other jurisdictions adopted similar remittitur rules with apparent
success. However, the court offered no analysis of these cases or their impact on subsequent litigation. Id. at 8, 976
P.2d at 8.
99. Id. at 9, 976 P.2d at 9.
100. Id. at 9-10, 976 P.2d at 9-10.
101. Id. at 8, 976 P.2d at 8.
102. Id. at 9, 976 P.2d at 9.
103. Id.
104. The court also asserted that this standard of review promotes efficiency because it ensures that reviewing
courts have a clear explanation of the trial judge's decision. Id.
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allowing the trial judge to override the jury's calculation and end the litigation
without appellate review.
The decision in Allsup's makes it much more difficult for a judge to override a
jury's verdict. Plaintiffs may now seek immediate appellate review of remittitur
orders that they feel are inappropriate. They do not need to endure a costly and
lengthy new trial beforehand. A trial judge cannot use the risk of losing the total
award of damages while incurring additional trial expenses as a tool to persuade the
plaintiff to accept a remittitur. Now, an appellate court must also agree that the
award was improper before a new trial will take place. As a result, Allsup's protects
the principle that juries should ordinarily determine damages by making it more
difficult for a trial judge to override a verdict.
Moreover, Allsup's created a distinction between the appeal process for orders
proposing a remittitur and the appeal process for orders granting a new trial without
providing the remittitur alternative. This contrast will encourage defendants to move
for a new trial, rather than a remittitur, when the defendants perceive a jury verdict
to be excessive.
When an appellate court reviews a remittitur order, the burden rests with the
appellee. 05 The defendant must present specific findings that passion or prejudice
tainted the jury's award of damages."° In Allsup's, the New Mexico Supreme Court
reinstated the jury verdict because North River could not meet this difficult test.107
A remittitur order accepted under protest is also immediately appealable.' °
Unlike remittitur orders, appellate courts review orders granting a new trial based
on the standard of abuse of discretion.'" In Rhein v. ADT Automotive, Inc., 10 the
court explained that it applies this standard because trial judges observe the
demeanor of witnesses and hear all the evidence firsthand."' New trial orders also
differ from remittitur orders because they are not subject to immediate appeal." 2
Except in extraordinary cases, an appellant may only appeal after the conclusion of
the second trial because a new trial order is not a final judgment.' "'
The distinction between the appeal process for remittitur orders and new trial
orders will likely encourage defendants to move for a new trial, instead of moving
for a remittitur, in the event that they find a jury's verdict excessive. A remittitur
order accepted under protest is immediately appealable and a heavy burden rests
with the defendant. If a defendant moves for remittitur and the trial judge grants the
motion, the defendant must then show on appeal specific findings that the jury's
verdict was the product of passion or prejudice.
On the otherhand, if the defendant moves only for a new trial, his or her
likelihood of success is much higher. If the judge grants the motion, it is the plaintiff
who carries the burden on appeal of showing that the trial judge abused his
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 10, 976 P.2d at 10.
108. Id. at 9, 976 P.2d at 9.
109. State v. Chavez, 98 N.M. 682, 684, 652 P.2d 232, 234 (1982).
110. 122 N.M. 646,651,930 P.2d 783, 788 (1996).
111. Id. at 650, 930 P.2d at 787.
112. Id.
113. Id.
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discretion. The plaintiff can appeal only after the conclusion of the second trial. As
a result, filing a motion for a new trial is now a much more attractive option for a
defendant than filing a motion for a remittitur.
A trial judge who is determined to impose a remittitur order may still be able to
defeat a plaintiff's strategy of filing only a motion for a new trial. In rare cases,
judges have entered remittiturs sua sponte. 4 Thus, a trial judge could potentially
order a remittitur even when the defendant filed only a motion for a new trial. In
doing so, however, the judge would subject himself or herself to a much greater
chance of reversal on appeal than if he or she granted the new trial motion requested
by the plaintiff without offering the remittitur alternative.
The justification for the different standards for appeals of remittitur orders and
appeals of new trial orders seems to be the court's concern about protecting the right
to trial by jury. An order for a new trial does not jeopardize that right because the
defendant has the opportunity to present his or her case again. A remittitur order is
different. Under the old standard where an appeal was prohibited until the
conclusion of the second trial, a plaintiff could be persuaded into accepting the
remittitur and so end the litigation. This option allowed the trial judge to substitute
his decision on damages for the jury's decision. As such, judicial concern about
protecting the right to trial by jury best explains the different standards of review for
remittitur orders and new trial orders.
The court failed to explain, however, why a trial judge's firsthand observations
of the proceedings matter more when reviewing a new trial order than when
reviewing a remittitur order. Rhein explained that an abuse of discretion standard
was appropriate because a trial judge is better positioned to observe the demeanor
of witnesses and hear evidence firsthand." 5 Indeed, the trial judge is better
positioned than an appellate court to observe demeanor and hear evidence in a
remittitur case as well. Despite this, the court adopted a different standard without
offering an explanation for why firsthand knowledge was less important.
The decision in Allsup's also raises the question of how New Mexico courts will
treat future cases that involve motions for additur. Additur is the opposite of
remittitur. It is an order by which a court offers the defendant the option of either
consenting to a higher award of damages or undergoing a new trial.' 6 Although
additur has been declared unconstitutional in the federal court system," 7 the
procedure remains permissible under New Mexico law. 18
In the past, appellate courts have reviewed the propriety of additur orders by
examining the evidence on damages in the light most favorable to upholding the
judgment.'19 Such deference to the decision of the trial judge directly conflicts with
the rationale underlying Allsup's, where the New Mexico Supreme Court sought to
protect the constitutional right to trial by jury by making it more difficult for judges
114. See Bender v. City of New York, 78 F.3d 787 (2d Cir. 1996); Spray-Rite Service Corp. v. Monsanto Co.,
684 F.2d 1226 (7th Cir. 1982).
115. Rhein, 122 N.M. at 651,930 P.2d at 788.
116. Jehl v. Southern Pacific Company, 427 P.2d 988 (Cal. 1967).
117. Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 486 (1935).
118. See Baxter v. Gannaway, 113 N.M. 45,822 P.2d 1128 (Ct. App. 1991).
119. Id.
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to substitute their judgment for that of a jury. There is no principled reason why
courts should review jury verdicts deemed excessive differently from jury verdicts
deemed inadequate. Both remittitur orders and additur orders can interfere with the
right to trial by jury by giving a court the opportunity to substitute its judgment for
that of the jury. Therefore, Allsup's provides defendants who contest additur orders
in future cases with a strong argument that additur and remittitur should be treated
the same and the burden should rest in both types of cases with the party seeking to
override the jury's verdict.
Trial judge Susan Conway could have achieved the result she intended by
granting North River's motion for a new trial, rather than its motion for a remittitur.
Allsup's is unusual in that the trial judge's order was clearly intended to leave the
plaintiff with no choice but to accept a new trial. Remittitur orders generally reduce
a jury's verdict by an amount that will present the plaintiff with a meaningful choice
between accepting the remittitur or opting for the new trial. For example, in
Montgomery, the jury awarded the plaintiff $5000 and the court remitted $2000.120
Here, the trial judge's order left the plaintiff with no award at all. Thus, the
convenience store chain had no reasonable choice but to undergo a new trial.
The New Mexico Supreme Court's decision in Allsup's conflicts with a recent
trend of cases in which federal and state courts have increased judicial control over
punitive damage awards. That trend developed amidst much publicity about
extraordinarily high awards of damages. 2' In BMW of North America, Inc. v.
Gore,122 the United States Supreme Court held that although juries deserve
considerable flexibility when assessing punitive damages, some awards are so
excessive that they violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 3
BMW held that a person not only deserves fair notice regarding what conduct will
subject him or her to punishment, but also deserves notice regarding the severity of
the penalty for such conduct.'24 Thus, the Court set forth a test that lower courts
should use to ensure more careful review of jury verdicts awarding punitivedamages. 12"
The New Mexico Supreme Court recently imposed a stricter standard for
awarding punitive damages in contract cases. In Paiz v. State Farm Fire and
Casualty Co., the court stated that punitive damages cannot be predicated on gross
negligence, but may only arise from conduct that is malicious, fraudulent,
oppressive, or committed recklessly or with wanton disregard for the plaintiff's
rights. 126 In tort law, there is no equivalent case rejecting gross negligence as
grounds for punitive damages; however, the New Mexico Supreme Court rewrote
120. 65 N.M. at 107, 332 P.2d at 1027.
121. Daniel M. Weddle, Insurance Law Annual: A Practitioner's Guide to Litigating Punitive Damages after
BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 47 DRAKE L. REV. 661, 676-77 (1999); See Uebeck v. McDonald's
Restaurants, P.T.S., Inc., No. CV-93-02419, 1995 WL 360309 (N.M. Dist. Ct. Aug. 18, 1994) (jury awarded
plaintiff $2.9 million after she was severely burned when she spilled coffee purchased at a drive-thru window).
122. 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
123. BMW, 517 U.S. at 568.
124. Id. at 574.
125. Id.
126. 118 N.M. 203, 211, 880 P.2d 300, 308 (1994). The court explained that punitive damages serve the
limited purpose of punishing and deterring certain conduct, and, therefore, may only be awarded based on evidence
of a culpable mental state.
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the Uniform Jury Instructions to exclude gross negligence as a ground for punitive
damages in tort cases.'27
Allsup's conflicts with the general trend favoring greater judicial control over
awards of punitive damages. In BMW, the Court reversed a jury's award of damages
because it was so excessive that the award violated the United States Constitution.
In Paiz, the court reversed a jury's award of punitive damages because it held that
such damages were inappropriate in cases of grossly negligent conduct. Unlike those
cases, Allsup's decreases the power of courts to interfere with jury verdicts by
placing the burden on defendants to justify remittitur orders. The Allsup's opinion
reinstated the jury's verdict because North River could not meet this heavy burden.
Thus, Allsup's runs counter to the trend of increased judicial control over awards of
punitive damages.
Although Allsup's made a positive change in New Mexico law, the decision also
raises questions about whether the court acted properly when it decided to hear the
case. The New Mexico Supreme Court heard this case because Allsup's appealed
an order by the trial judge that granted North River's motion for a remittitur.'28
Allsup' s argued that the ambiguously worded order violated the constitttion because
it did not offer the party a choice between accepting the remittitur or accepting a
new trial. 29 At the time that the Supreme Court accepted the case, it was well
established in New Mexico case law that remittitur orders were not final judgments,
and as a result were unappealable. 30 Indeed, the Court stated, "Allsup's appeal
initially appeared not to be accommodated by our case law and appellate rules."''
Nevertheless, the Court heard Allsup's appeal and radically changed remittitur
procedure in New Mexico.
North River raised a good argument that the Court should have denied Allsup's
appeal. The trial court obviously intended the remittitur order to provide Allsup's
with a choice, at least theoretically, between accepting or rejecting the new trial even
though it did not make its intention very clear. The court indeed determined that
"[t]he [trial] court exercising its discretionary power, albeit ambiguously, offered
Allsup's the option of remitting part of the award or accepting a new trial."'3
Consequently, if the court only considered the issue raised on appeal, i.e., whether
Judge Conway issued a unilateral remittitur, Allsup's appeal could have been
denied. As North River suggested in its answer brief, the court could have remanded
the case to the trial court with clear instructions to offer Allsup's a choice between
accepting the remittitur or receiving a new trial.'33 Doing so would have satisfied the
choice requirement while avoiding the complex issue of whether remittitur
procedure in New Mexico violated the state constitution.
127. N.M. UJ.I. Civ. 13-1718.
128. Allsup's, 127 N.M. at 6, 976 P.2d at 6.
129. Appellant's Brief-In-Chief at 9, Allsup's Convenience Stores, Inc. v. North River Ins. Co., 976 P.2d 1
(N.M. 1998) (No. 22621).
130. Nally v. Texas Arizona Motor Freight, Inc., 67 N.M. 153, 353 P.2d 678 (1960).
131. Allsup's, 127 N.M. at 6, 976 P.2d at 6.
132. Id.
133. Appellee's Answer Brief at 5, Allsup's Convenience Stores, Inc. v. North River Ins. Co. 976 P.2d I
(N.M. 1998) (No. 22621).
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V. CONCLUSION
Allsup's made a significant change in New Mexico remittitur procedure that
protects the appropriate balance of power between judges and juries. The court's
decision ensures that trial courts can only use a remittitur order to override a jury
verdict when the judge can articulate good reasons. As a result, the court's decision
will probably lead most defendants to file motions for a new trial, rather than
motions for a remittitur, when they believe that a jury awarded excessive damages.
